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Alessandro Ferrara’s attempt to interpret the “spirit of democracy” offers us a perspicuous insight into the issues 
at stake, on the background of contemporary “inhospitable” conditions for representative government. These 
issues are approached from new perspectives, offering original points of view. Nonetheless the deliberate choice 
to approach such issues “from the normative framework developed by Rawls in Political Liberalism” partially 
inhibits the possibility of actually engaging with the challenges Ferrara so vividly sketches in their full radical 
complexity. 
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Mainstream political theory in the 20th Century could be described as a slippery slope on 
which democracy distanced itself from its normative foundations in a melancholic downsizing 
of expectations. Elitist political science negated the very possibility of democratic government 
at the beginning of the century, and was replied by the different versions of “democratic 
elitism”. Joseph Schumpeter reduced democracy to a method for selecting governmental 
elites, whereas Robert Dahl reinterpreted it as a “poliarchy” of different groups capable of 
influencing the executive power. At that juncture, even such austere reformulations as these 
seemed too optimistic: we might recall Norberto Bobbio’s reflections on the “broken 
promises” of democracy, the analysis of its perverse effects and “evolutive risks”, or the 
condemnation of its sluggishness in making decisions, lack of efficiency and poor 
accountability. A series of successive surrenders that radical participative theories tried to 
counter by criticizing liberal(-bourgeois) representative democracy while other scholars 
wished for technocratic remedies. 
 Recent scholarship has partially modified this picture. Since the last decades of the last 
century, the different versions of deliberative theories have focused on the communicative 
dimension implicit in the democratic process of decision-making. In so doing, they re-opened 
a debate on democratic procedures that ended with suggesting new means of consulting the 
public, if not actual popular participation. From another point of view, processes of 
transnational and international integration require that we transcend the domestic 
dimension. At the same time, however, global society displays a redistribution of functions 
and powers between public and private agencies, economic and political institutions that 
jeopardizes the very possibility of democratic government. 
 Faced with such a scenario, some authors have gone back to considering the profound 
issue of the very meaning of democracy, often returning to its ancient Greek origins1, and The 
Democratic Horizon can be understood in this framework. While Max Weber investigated the 
“spirit of capitalism”, Alessandro Ferrara’s aim is to interpret the “spirit of democracy”, that is, 
the “democratic ethos that underlies and enlivens the procedural aspects of democracy and 
that […] proves difficult to reproduce at will and to be ‘trivially imitated’” (p. 5). Democratic 
                                                        
1 In recent Italian scholarship, examples are the books by Nadia Urbinati, Democrazia in diretta, Milano, 
Feltrinelli, 2013; Democracy Disfigured. Opinion, Truth, and the People, Cambridge MA-London, Harvard 
University Press, 2014  and Geminello Preterossi, Ciò che resta della democrazia, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2015. 
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procedures are indeed compatible with their “trivializing emulation”: they can be “formally 
satisfied yet substantively deprived of all meaning”, whereas “elections without democracy” 
are possible and the “significance of electoral representation” is changing (p. 4). In his 
farewell to the “procedural strategy,” Ferrara revives the approach modeled by interpreters of 
the democratic ethos such as Alexis de Tocqueville and John Dewey and adopts a longue durée 
perspective: “Democracy is coeval with the philosophical conversation about politics initiated 
by Plato in The Republic” (p. 3); however, after having represented a form of government (and 
a bad one, we might add, according to mainstream political thought) for almost two and half 
millennia, democracy has become “the quintessentially legitimate form of government” (p. 4) 
and, eventually, a horizon.  
Nevertheless, the terrain of democracy has become more and more inhospitable. Ferrara 
quotes four issues identified by Frank Michelman in 1997: “The immense extension of the 
electorate”; “The institutional complexity of contemporary societies” (p.  6); “The increased 
cultural pluralism of constituencies”; and “The anonymous quality of the processes of political 
will-formation” (p. 7); the main response to these conditions was democratic “dualist” 
constitutionalism which only refers the consent of the governed to a higher level of law-
making. At the beginning of the 3rd millennium, the situation has been exacerbated by the 
addition of further “inhospitable” conditions. Ferrara indicates the powerful influence 
migratory flows have on citizenship, creating a scenario that is increasingly similar to ancient 
polis with alien residents and even slaves. He adds “the prevailing of3 finance within the 
capitalist economy” that has in fact actually “revived traits of brutality typical of earlier stages, 
of capitalism at the onset of the Industrial Revolution”, including “the terminal decline of 
employed labor qua generator of wealth and social prestige” (p. 8). He notes that “the 
acceleration of societal time contributes to a verticalization of social and political relations” 
(p. 9). Furthermore, financial globalization and global challenges fuel “tendencies towards 
supranational integration” (p. 8). In addition, however, the public sphere is suffering a second 
“structural transformation”. The new social media are generating an “incipient re-
aggregation” of the traditional atomized audience with the rise of new opinion leaders and a 
crisis in the quality press. Finally, Ferrara stresses the widespread diffusion “of opinion polls 
and their influence on the perceived legitimacy of executive action” (p. 8). Consequently, on 
the one side “democratic polities […] will have to develop new forms of adaptation to a social 
environment that is by and large more unfavorable” while on the other side “democracy 
constitutes a hope for vast regions of the world” (p. 12). 
With this diagnosis, Ferrara goes to the heart of the matter; he offers us a perspicuous 
insight into the issues at stake in every attempt to make sense of the democratic heritage in 
our epoch. Through the chapters of the book these issues are approached from new 
perspectives, offering original points of view. Ferrara declares that his aim is to take on 
contemporary challenges to democracy “from the normative framework developed by Rawls 
in Political Liberalism”. The differences between its  approach and that developed in A Theory 
of Justice are emphasized and the Rawlsian view is rounded out by the supplementary 
conceptual resources provided by the “aesthetic sources of normativity”, i.e. exemplarity, 
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judgment and the imagination, as Ferrara himself investigated in his previous books2. In so 
doing, political liberalism is empowered to release “its full potential”, and Ferrara’s move to 
recover the democratic ethos can be seen as a way of updating – or upgrading – the Rawlsian 
paradigm. My thesis is that, unfortunately, this choice partially inhibits the possibility of 
actually engaging with the challenges Ferrara so vividly sketches in their full radical 
complexity due to certain intrinsic features of Rawlsian theory as well as the fact that it was 
formulated and developed before the contemporary wave of globalization3. Imprisoned 
within the Rawlsian horizon, Ferrara’s text does not allow us to get the theoretical satisfaction 
we might have hoped for after reading his shrewd diagnoses. 
 
 
This is apparent from the beginning, that is from the seminal definition of politics that opens 
the book. Ferrara takes care to emphasize not only the Machiavellian autonomy of politics 
from morality but also its autonomy from metaphysics, on a farewell to Plato’s myth of the 
cave launched by Hannah Arendt and developed by Rawls himself. If standards “are to be 
found inside politics and not outside it” (p. 28), in a global world we must undertake 
“methodological nationalism.” Ferrara conducts a (reductive, in my view) reading of the 
Machiavellian autonomy of politics from morals as the statement of a “deontological 
difference” of rulers. However, as far as we approximate the ideal of a cosmopolitan rule of 
law, “all justification for the deontological difference collapses in light of the concrete 
actionability in international courts of the torts unjustly suffered by a single state” (p. 30). One 
might question if – at least ideally – that is not already true in the framework of modern 
constitutionalism. At any rate Ferrara’s definition of politics as “the activity of promoting, with 
outcomes purportedly binding or at least influential for all, the priority of certain publicly 
relevant ends over others not simultaneously pursuable, or of promoting new ends and 
promoting them in full autonomy from both morals and theory within a horizon no longer 
coextensive with the nation state” (p. 30) implies “the exchange of reasons as a part and parcel 
of that more general attempt […] to promote the priority of certain public ends” (p. 32).  
This is not a mere re-visitation of deliberative democracy, however: Ferrara’s originality 
lies in implying “a moment of judgment” in order to make decisions, the very dimension of 
recognition and “the moment of gift giving” (p. 35) as constitutive elements of politics; the 
same originality is shown in the attempt to define politics at its best as “the weaving of vision 
into the texture of what is possible” (p. 37), i.e. “the prioritization of ends in the light of good 
reasons that can move our imagination” (p. 38). The latter is seen as the “potential for 
disclosing a new political world for us, in which we recognize the reflection of our freedom” (p. 
40). In my opinion, the author suggests promising directions here; and they seem to indicate 
paths for escaping from the repetition of the same normative themes that affected 
mainstream political philosophy in the last decades. Nevertheless, his definition of politics 
                                                        
2 Cp. A. Ferrara, Reflective Authenticity. Rethinking the Project of Modernity, London and New York, Routledge, 
1998; Justice and Judgment. The Rise and the Prospect of the Judgment Model in Contemporary Political Philosophy , 
London, Sage, 1999; The Force of the Example. Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 2008. 
3 I approached this issue in my article “Rawls e le sfide della globalizzazione”, in A. Punzi (ed.), Omaggio a John 
Rawls (1921-2002). Giustizia, diritto, ordine internazionale, Quaderni della Rivista internazionale di filosofia del 
diritto, Milano, Giuffré, 2004, pp. 429-65. 
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seems to remove the very question of power – seen simply as “an ineliminable fact of politics, 
just as crime is an ineliminable component of social action” (pp. 36-37) – that is quite 
consistent with the Rawlsian approach. 
 The imagination, inherent in politics at its best, re-emerges in Ferrara’s 
characterization of the “spirit of democracy”. Three components of “democratic culture” – the 
necessary condition for stabilizing democracy and making it flourish – are collected from the 
tradition of modern political thought: (a) the  Montesquieuan “political sentiment of virtue 
[…] that includes an orientation towards the common good” (p. 45), revived in the 
“reciprocity” of Rawls and constitutive of democracy according the deliberative theory; (b) 
The Tocquevillean passion for equality which includes freedom and re-surfaces today in the 
theory of recognition elaborated by Axel Honneth, Charles Taylor, Avishai Margalit; and (c) 
individualism, interpreted in the peculiarly American version expressed by authors such as 
Thoreau, Emerson and Whitman. 
Ferrara adds a fourth element: a passion for openness “that orients opinion in the public 
sphere in the direction of favoring unconventional solutions” (p. 48) and is the opposite of a 
fear of the unknown. Conveniently, Ferrara takes a step back from “the reductionism implicit 
in Popper’s view of the so-called open society”: “nothing appears as ambiguous and closed as 
the ‘open society’” (p. 52)4.  
Here is one of the main points on which the Rawlsian paradigm is fertilized by a 
reference to the aesthetic sources of normativity: exemplarity is seen as “an exceptional self-
congruency that should not be understood […] along merely coherentistic lines”. And Rawls’ 
“notion of the ‘reasonable’ can be used for exporting this view of exemplary normativity into 
the realm of politics”. Bearing a family resemblance with works of art and creative life 
courses, ‘openness’ can be seen as “the property of those elements that set the imagination in 
motion, create a space of possibilities, allow for the space of reasons (and judgment) to work 
and constitute a standard of political desirability” (p. 65).  
What this work appears to re-open is political liberalism itself. While Rawls considers it 
suitable only in a liberal democratic political culture (and more or less explicitly in the 
Christian protestant heritage), chapter 3 provides a pioneering attempt to extend political 
liberalism to different experiences. This seems to be unavoidable given the radical appeal by 
political and religious pluralism among today’s Western democracies. Traditional versions of 
pluralism seem “to admit pluralism in many areas except when it comes to the reasons why 
pluralism should be accepted”. This kind of “liberal monopluralism” ends up leading to a 
“fundamentalization of tolerance and individual autonomy”. The proposed alternative is the 
idea of a “reflexive pluralism”. Ferrara argues that, on one side, a pragmatic approach – the 
idea that pluralism is useful “for protecting us from the evils of conflict” – “can at best help 
consolidate a modus vivendi”, but “It cannot fully legitimate a democratic order” (p. 72). On 
the other side, “principled pluralism” based on the Kantian view of autonomy does not work 
with people “who do not share either the moral individualistic premise, the value of autonomy 
or the premise of the equality of citizens” (p. 73). The third alternative is presented (with 
                                                        
4 “Where the planned society pivots around the state, open society pivots around the market” (p. 51); in contrast, 
as authors such as Dewey, Keynes, Rawls and Habermas have shown, “market dynamics lead to oppressive 
results and the preservation of openness requires regulation, usually of a legislative and constitutional kind” (p. 
53). 
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“epistemic humility”) as “one among several possible ways of arguing for the acceptance of 
pluralism, and it rejects the very idea of one conclusive argument for pluralism as incurring in 
the risk of a performative contradiction” (p. 73). The reasonable instead of the rational 
constitutes the benchmark and the arguments are presented in the form of conjecture. 
The author engages in proposing three conjectural arguments. According to the first, 
integralistic Catholics and fundamentalist Protestants could accept pluralism as far as they 
consider the imposition of a single religious vision as running the risk of idolatry, e.g. the 
divinization of what is human, and acknowledge that “the Church constitutes the embodiment 
of ‘Truth and Life’ for the Christian, but also represents a concrete, contextual historical home 
in which the Christian cannot be completely at home” (p. 79). This first argument is based on 
an essay by Robert Bellah, while Michael Walzer inspires the second one by differentiating 
between two prophetic currents in ancient Judaism. The first current, exemplified by Isaiah, 
emphasized the uniqueness of salvation and consequently of the good society, thereby posing 
the Jews as “a light for the Gentiles”, but the second one is intrinsically pluralistic.  According 
to Amos, the Israelites are not the only chosen people; their history has an exemplary 
significance, but other experiences of liberation are also possible. Finally, Andrew March 
suggests an argument for Islam that is actually based on Rawlsian political liberalism, which 
makes the most of studies by Muslim authors such as Tariq Ramadan and Abdullahi Ahmed 
An-Na‘im: “The major normative force that can motivate the Muslim believer to a loyal 
adhesion to a democratic secular state is the duty to fulfil contractual obligations, strongly 
emphasized by both the text of the Qur’ân and in the mainstream interpretations of it over 
time” (p. 83). Moreover, the jihad can be interpreted in a strictly defensive sense and the 
passages of Qur’ân which prohibit loyalty to non-believers have been contextualized as 
written in the Medina period of the Prophet’s life. Similar exercises could be repeated for 
other comprehensive visions, and “the original program of Rawls ‘political liberalism’ will be 
expanded in the direction of a ‘conjectural turn’ that complements the original emphasis on 
public reason with a new emphasis on conjecture” (p. 87).  
In my opinion, these impressive efforts point in the right direction by rethinking the 
question of cultural pluralism. Ferrara opportunely stresses the tentative character of these 
arguments. When he reminds (Western) liberals and democrats that “their case for pluralism 
is but one among a ‘plurality of pluralism’, not the one doctrine of pluralism that other 
political cultures of the planet ignore at their peril” (p. 87), he evokes another central point. 
Intercultural dialogue requires participants to work hard: to engage themselves in a re-
interpretation of their values, principles, paradigms and consuetudes; this is the endeavor 
that Boaventura De Sousa Santos has called “diatopic hermeneutics”, i.e. calling into question 
the topoi, the cognitive and normative commonplaces of different cultural experiences. 
Moreover, mutual recognition does not happen  in a vacuum, in an ideal discursive situation 
or under  the veil of ignorance. Recognition presupposes struggles and social conflicts that are 
moral but not solely 
 
 
These problems emerge in examining the phenomenon of hyperpluralism. How are we to 
confront a case in which even conjectural arguments fail? According to Ferrara, “the received 
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view of political liberalism” has to be amended because of the “high degree of normative 
idealization that is still present” (p. 89) in it and the “element of contingency that Rawls 
associated with normativity”. In other words, Rawls sees overlapping consensus as the 
possibility of overcoming the conflict between Lockean and Rousseauian versions of liberal 
democratic political culture. The “fact of reasonable pluralism” was inspired by “a highly 
stylized picture” (p. 90) of the United States, but the mere presence of Roman Catholic or 
Christian Orthodox religious cultures, or of political visions inspired by Marxism in Europe 
and elsewhere serves to blur this picture, and of course our contemporary experience is more 
and more complex when we consider the effects of massive immigration, the intrinsic 
dynamism of civil society and religious evolution. We might seem that our only options are, on 
one side, the imposition of liberal-democratic principles by force, misrecognition of the 
alternatives and propaganda (“stability for the wrong reasons”), and, on the other side, “justa 
modus vivendi”. However, Ferrara maintains that we are not entrapped in such a dilemma: 
“Rawls’s political philosophy is rich enough to offer us a less bleak alternative answer” (p. 91). 
Indeed, he is unsatisfied by alternative proposals such as the “agonistic” interpretation of 
hyperpluralism. 
The author criticizes the thesis developed by Chantal Mouffe in particular. According to 
Mouffe, the idea of pluralism without conflict is an illusion, and the exclusion of 
“unreasonable” views masks “what is really a political decision as a moral exigency” (p. 93), 
assimilating the reasonable into liberal doctrine. Ferrara contextualizes these theses, albeit in 
my view not all that persuasively: if it is true that Rawls distinguishes moral constructivism 
from political constructivism, his conception of what is “political” is quite different from what 
Mouffe appears to mean. More radically, Mouffe’s critiques of the requisite of reasonableness 
are seen as implying an inability to distinguish between coercive and non-coercive forms of 
political order. In so doing, she “loses the possibility of identifying any foothold on which a 
critique of existing hegemonic practices, existing grammars of the political, existing patterns 
of exclusion could rest its claim to constitute something other than an irrelevantly different 
(and possibly even more oppressive) form of hegemony” (p. 94). Frankly, I do not understand 
why acknowledging the peculiarity of the political and the insurmountability of political 
conflict would mean losing all evaluative and normative arguments, even contextual or of an 
exemplary kind, not to mention immanent critique. At any rate, Ferrara makes use of some 
theses elaborated by other theories of agonistic pluralism. James Tully, he writes, “highlights 
and offers us a possibility of correcting a blind spot of Rawls’s view” (p. 96), namely the idea 
of a linear and one-directional transition from modus vivendi to overlapping consensus.  
Through this discussion, Ferrara grasps one of the main problematic aspects of Political 
Liberalism. Overlapping consensus, seen as a moral agreement (neither a political 
compromise nor the acceptation of legal principles) imposes a heavy ethical burden on the 
parts involved, and the kind of “reasonableness” required by the comprehensive doctrines is 
quite demanding5. One might ask if such a consensus has ever been possible outside the 
Philadelphia Convention (and, I would add, without removing thorny issues such as slavery); 
                                                        
5 Cp. e.g. the section on the issue of abortion in Rawls’s book, where the official moral doctrine of the Roman 
Catholic Church is considered unreasonable: J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 
1993, pp. 242-43 n. 32. 
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In any case, the genesis of post-Second World War constitutions in Europe, Latin America, 
South Africa etc. cannot be reconstructed according to this framework6. Ferrara does not 
contest Rawls’ view of overlapping consensus, however. Rather, he connects it with another 
model – in my opinion even more problematic – elaborated by Rawls in his last book, The Law 
of Peoples. 
This book outlines a distinction in the global landscape between (a) liberal peoples and 
liberal societies; (b) decent peoples and well-ordered hierarchical societies; and (c) outlaw 
states. In this framework, the law of peoples is the law stated by liberal peoples, which 
tolerates decent peoples and admit them under the veil of ignorance. However, the “not ideal 
theory” concerning outlaw states is identified with the just war theory7. One can imagine 
three concentric circles, and there is something disturbing in the very idea of a club of liberal 
countries that establishes the principles of the law of peoples and tolerates only those 
countries that accept them. This approach is a regression in relation to existing international 
institutions, a network open to all peoples. Moreover, the main instrument for enforcing the 
law of peoples seems to be war; Rawls appears blind to the various forms of international and 
transnational jurisdiction, including the ICC, not to mention measures to de-potentiate 
geopolitical, economic-financial, social and anthropological factors of “political injustice”. 
I find the proposal that this framework be applied to hyperpluralist societies in a sort of 
reversal of the domestic analogy8 even more disturbing. Opportunely, Ferrara wishes to 
overcome the “mental cramp” represented by the assumption that there is a “preordained 
sequence of stages”: conflict  modus vivendi  constitutional consensus  overlapping 
consensus. In order to do so, however, he suggests we conceive of the “democratic polity as a 
multivariate unity that includes both overlapping-consensus type and modus vivendi-type 
relations between the citizens”; we thus have “three kinds of citizens: (a) citizens who 
embrace all the constitutional essentials in the light of principles rooted in their 
comprehensive moral conceptions […]; (b) citizens who embrace some of the constitutional 
essentials in the light of principles rooted in their comprehensive moral conceptions and 
other constitutional essentials (for example, the free exercise of religion) out of merely 
prudential reasons; and (c) citizens who embrace all of the constitutional essentials out of 
prudential reasons” (p. 107). Ferrara risks giving the impression that he proposes to exclude 
every form of mutual learning and cross-fertilization, but I do not think that is his intention. 
Nonetheless, this image of the multivariate polity appears consistent with the image of our 
societies that Ferrara clearly sketches when he writes that contemporary democracies 
“resemble more and more the ancient democracies, inhabited by citizens who would decide 
the fate of denizens of various kinds and of slaves”. That is to say, “many who are not citizens 
at all: resident aliens, immigrants awaiting legal residency, illegal aliens who have no chance 
of becoming residents, refugees, people enslaved by human-trafficking rackets” (p. 8). 
                                                        
6 Note that the dynamics of the Italian Assemblea Costituente in 1946-47 – in which liberals, socialists, 
communists and Christian democrats debated not being able to forecast the results of the following elections – 
has been interpreted in light of the original position/veil of ignorance model.   
7 Rawls adheres sine glossa to the version of the theory elaborated by Michael Walzer, including the doctrine of 
“supreme emergency”. This renders problematic any move to exclude pre-emptive strikes, as Ferrara does with a 
surplus of charity (p. 106). 
8 Cp. C. Bottici, Men and States. Rethinking the Domestic Analogy in a Global Age, London, Palgrave, 2009. 
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Moreover, it seems to me that the Law of Peoples model is incompatible with the attempt to 
“disentangle the ‘spirit of democracy’ from its original roots in the culture of radical 
Protestantism and envisage a plurality of ‘cultures of democracy’ anchored to various 
civilizational bedrocks” (p. 109). The points of reference here are Shmuel Eiseinstadt’s vision 
of “multiple modernities” and Karl Jaspers’ notion of “Axial Age”. According to Ferrara, 
modernity represents the second Axial Age, and he hypothesizes that the linguistic turn has 
ushered in a third one, characterized by “a sense of the equal dignity of the frames of meaning 
which shape our understanding of the world, a sense rooted in the post-Linguistic Turn 
sensibility and totally unknown to the previous two Axial Ages” (p. 124). The point is that this 
perspective can be extended to democracy: if democracy originated “qua self-government” 
during the first Axial Age, flourished during the second one and has become a general horizon 
today, one can conceive of a “program in political philosophy that directs our efforts toward 
understanding how the ingredients of the ‘spirit of democracy’ can originate from and flourish 
in civilizational contexts other than Christian and Protestant ones” (p. 126), i.e. the idea of 
“multiple democracies” rooted in several democratic ethoses. 
Ferrara locates a first moment of “consonance across diversity” in the idea of the common 
good (which reemerges in the Confucian vision of harmony, is emphasized by Muslim ulema 
and characterizes the Hindu tradition). He shows that the idea of consent as the grounds of 
legitimacy is present in Judaism as well as Hinduism and Buddhism; in the Islamic concept of 
shura An-Na‘im sees “institutionalized constitutional principles that includes the population 
at large”. Several instances of convergence can also be found regarding the value of 
individuality and the more encompassing notion of person. 
There are indeed persisting forms of dissonance that made the project of “provincilizing” 
(Chakrabarty) Western liberal-democratic polities necessary. On one side, “much more 
unpalatable to non-Western cultures appears to be the very idea of subjective rights, qua 
prerogatives of the single individual against authority and potentially against the whole 
political community”, and the modern “priority of rights, qua subjective entitlements, over 
duties” (p. 133). For instance, in Muslim tradition rights are invoked as restorative concepts, 
and “the idea of rights ‘in general’, as preordained to any legal action and as unconditional 
prerogative of individuals,” is difficult to accept (p. 134). However, “such views are well 
represented also within Western culture and they form the backbone of the indigenous 
Western resistance to Protestant modernity” (p. 135). On the other side, the value that has 
been attributed – since Machiavelli’s praise for tumulti in Ancient Rome – to agonism and 
conflict is hard to accept on the part of cultures that are “wary of the ‘disharmony’ implicit in 
conflict, […] suspicious of the divisive potential unleashed by a plurality of organizations, 
parties, associations, newspapers, media” (p. 138): here it is more challenging to find non-
Western equivalents. I suggest that a more promising approach would lie in considering the 
widespread adoption of  rights speech by grassroots movements inside “non-Western” 
cultural contexts and initiatives. At any rate, Ferrara proposes a table of the “Multiple 
Democracies and Their Ethos” on this basis (p. 141). Even if this specific typology is not 
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wholly persuasive, one cannot help but appreciate Ferrara’s attempt to open a new, highly 
relevant and vital research field. 
 
 
Ferrara’s innovative mix of Rawlsian concepts, Wittgensteinan themes and reference to the 
aesthetic forms of normativity constitutes the foundation for convincing arguments in defense 
of multiculturalism (including one based on the value of freedom itself, for instance). If there 
is one critique to be made, it would be that the author gives the impression of 
underestimating the transformation, contamination and cross-influence of cultures, and of the 
multiple forms of belonging that affect contemporary individuals, even though Ferrara does 
clarify the difference between the cognitive question and the practical one. The final chapter 
returns to examining Joshua Cohen’s project of a “political not metaphysical” conception of 
truth. This vision is urgent because we need “a notion of truth that allows ultimate truths to 
share a common political space without causing such space to regress to a renewed state of 
nature within whose bounds only force or the threat of its use decides which political theology 
is to prevail” (p. 187). Ferrara affirms that the Rawlsian vision of the reasonable has marked a 
conceptual revolution “in opposition only to a certain function that truth has played in 
perfectionist conceptions of politics” (p. 190). He advances “a nonpartisan view of truth […] 
neutral also with respect to the ‘truth versus justification’” (p. 218). 
What I find more problematic is the way the question of governance is considered, i.e. 
“the coordination and regulation of political action in the absence of a capacity to impose 
sanctions for noncompliance” (p. 173). Connected to the widespread diffusion of soft law and 
standards like “best practices” and “benchmarking”, Ferrara sees governance as based not on 
the monopoly of the force but rather on “a softer kind of monopoly […] on the monopoly of the 
attribution of legitimacy” (p. 174). The question is whether this means a regression in 
democracy, and Ferrara suggests that this issue be approached from the point of view of 
deliberative theories. This approach aids in clarifying that democracy is not a synonym of 
majority rule, and the absence of coercion need not be seen as a problem. The thorny question 
of “the assumption of the legislative authorship of the demos” (p. 177) can be solved in light of 
the dualistic constitutionalism that Rawls borrows from Ackerman and Michelman. Practices 
of governance do not  depress the democratic quality of institutions if and only if “they take 
place within the boundaries of ‘constitutional essentials’ that meet with the consent of free 
and equal citizens as manifested in referenda or in more indirect but still recognizable ways” 
and “some recognizable form of accountability remains in place” (p. 178). Focusing on the 
democratic deficit of the EU, Ferrara optimistically states that “what we witness is the 
burgeoning  rise of a new kind of democratic authorship of the ‘citizens of the world’ within 
the cosmopolitan institution of a possible future” (p. 181). More than traditional competitive 
elitism, “Deliberative democracy is compatible not with the denial or disappearance of the 
legislative authorship of citizens, but with a more indirect reconfiguring of it” (pp. 181-82). 
“No reason thus exists for supporters of deliberative democracy to experience anxiety vis-à-
vis the rise and diffusion of processes of governance in the postnational context of 
contemporary politics” (p. 184). 
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Unfortunately the anxiety remains, together with the feeling that Ferrara grants 
insufficient weight to the features of the contemporary metamorphosis of law and politics9. 
We are witnessing a re-dislocation of power from politics to the financial economy and from 
public to private agencies (indeed, against the background of a redistribution of income and 
wealth from the poorest to the richest). Global law is under construction through the 
progressive substitution of contract regulation, arbitrates and judge-made law to statute law 
enforced by representative legislatives10. The very normativity of law is fading, while 
governance is not capable of governing today’s huge concentrations of economic, geopolitical 
and symbolic power. If “a deliberative view of democracy can offer us a more adequate 
conceptual framework for grasping the nature and operation of that moral suasion that 
constitutes the best instrument for coordination within processes of governance” (p. 183), 
one might ask how moral the moral suasion is, and if it is truly suasion and not de facto 
coercion11. Regarding the EU, what is at stake is precisely the move to substitute the 
principles – the constitutional essentials – of the common constitutional heritage (social rights 
and the welfare model in primis) with financial parameters and the unconstrained hegemony 
of the principle of market competition. Confronted with this scenario, the reference to 
deliberative democracy and its typical procedures runs the risk, albeit unintentionally, of 
providing ideological fuel to neoliberal programs12. 
 
 
Let me conclude with some more general remarks. My impression is that the adoption of the 
Rawlsian paradigm results in a paradoxical undervaluation of the role and function of law and 
legal systems. After decades of denouncing the risks of “juridification”, Jürgen Habermas in his 
late works acknowledged and investigated the space of the legal medium between morality, 
on one side, and the economy and administration on the other side. Only the legal system is 
able to act as a “transformer”, downsizing the high voltage of moral principles in legal norms 
which can be understand by the system whose media are money and power. One might add 
that, under the rule of law, the confrontation between different comprehensive doctrines is 
not aimed at obtaining a deep moral consensus but rather at implementing legal regulation 
(think for instance of apparently unsolvable cases such as abortion laws). At a lower voltage, 
the principles are no longer the gods who fight for life or death as in the Weberian picture. 
Moreover, in his severe critique of George W. Bush’s “immediate moralization” of 
international politics, Habermas affirmed that, in the face of the plurality of the 
interpretations of principles – even universal principles – only a communicative process 
carried out inside a legal framework and according to legally defined procedures can be 
successful. It depends on “the logic of practical discourses; it is not a matter of good or bad 
                                                        
9 Cp. A. Catania, Metamorfosi del diritto. Decisione e norma nell’età globale, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2008. 
10 Cp. the works by Maria Rosaria Ferrarese, such as Le istituzioni della globalizzazione, Diritto e diritti nella società 
transnazionale, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2000; Prima lezione di diritto globale, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2012; “Governance: a 
Soft Revolution with Hard Political and Legal Effects”, Soft Power, 1, 2014. 
11 Let us think e. g. to the 2011 letter by Jean-Claude Trichet and Mario Draghi to the Italian Government, which 
sketched a program of economic and institutional reforms actually implemented in the following years. 
12 Cp. e. g. G. Moini, “How participation has become a hegemonic discursive resource: Towards an interpretivist 
research agenda”,  Critical Policy Studies, vol. 5, 2011, p. 149-168. 
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will”13. Only “inclusive legal procedures open to all of the parties involved that enjoin them to 
reciprocal perspective-taking” are able to “engage in the degree of decentering of interpretive 
perspectives demanded by the conceptual constraints of granting equal consideration to the 
interests of all”14. I think that a closer consideration of these instances could help amend the 
notion of overlapping consensus in his Rawlsian version. 
 Secondly, I have the feeling that the question of the peculiarity of politics, or “the 
political”, has been overcome too quickly in liquidating Mouffe’s positions. While the author 
does consider the Machiavellian positive evaluation of some forms of political conflict in 
typifying the different forms of democratic ethos, the resources of the historical and 
theoretical nexus of democracy, rights, political conflicts and the action of social movements 
do not appear to have been exploited. For instance, reducing power to an evil brackets an 
insightful analysis of its forms and complex function (from Arendt to Luhmann to Foucault) 
and of it also being a resource for politics and even democratic politics. 
The paradigm of Political Liberalism was elaborated by “a Harvard professor reflecting 
on the political experience of his part of the world” but is considered capable of confronting 
“challenges like hyperpluralism and, more generally, the new inhospitable conditions of 
democracy, that differ from the ones which originally prompted its elaboration”. According to 
Ferrara, this is possible by connecting the normativity of the reasonable “to its aesthetic 
sources – exemplarity, judgment, identity and the imagination” (p. 219). And yet, is this 
actually so? Or is this a generous attempt to adapt to anomalies, more or less similar to the 
astronomers who added hemicycles to the Tolemaic model as they waited for a new 
paradigm? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 J. Habermas, Der gespaltene Westen. Kleine politische Schriften X, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 2004 (Eng, tr. The 
Divwded West, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2006, p. 184. L’Occidente diviso, Laterza, Roma – Bari 2005, p. 94). 
14 Ibid., p. 103. 
